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THE RELEVANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
TO THE REVIVAL OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES
by J. ROBERT SCHAETZEL*
The slow evolution of political systems and law seems to have
resulted from man's painful and reluctant conclusion that
anarchy was marginally more objectionable than the restraints
order imposed on unlimited individual freedom of action. Ac-
celerating population growth, industrialization and the revolu-
tion in communications increasingly make anarchy a less feas-
ible alternative in the last years of the 20th Century.
And yet, under pressure from these basic factors, man's re-
action today has been not to intensify his long, largely hap-
hazard struggle to create order in a disorderly universe, but to
accept a human anthill. From Roman Church to temporal prince
and divine right to the Western European imperialism of the
18th Century, various systems which approached the universal
were imposed. Imperialism was an offense for which we all pay
today, but its not inconsequential side effect was to reduce
anarchy.
In turn, Woodrow Wilson's revulsion against European im-
perialism and nationalism, produced that grand failure, the
League of Nations; we now know that the collapse of Wilson's
crusade was less important than the seeds he planted for the
institution-building of the postwar period. 2 A unique confluence
of events permitted the innovations of the mid-20th Century.
World War II tore governments and people loose from old
moorings. Europeans, for a moment, had starkly illuminated the
emptiness of national sovereignty. Both in Asia and Europe new
doubts had been raised about established governments. The
*Currently writer, lecturer, and consultant on European-American relations; former State
Department official and Ambassador to the European Community, 1966-1972.
**The footnotes contained herein were prepared solely by the Journal Staff.
ISee H. NICOLSON. PEACEMAKING, 1919 at 35-38, 182-232 (1933).
By 1916 the Administration was disturbed by the "barbarism of the Germans," said to be
"the inveterate foe of all the ideals which we hold sacred and for which this republic
stands." R. LANSING. WAR MEMOIRS 102-104 (1986). Edward M. House, President Wilson's
friend and confidant, sensed the war spirit when he visited Paris in the summer of 1914.
The trouble with Germany seemed to be "militarism run mad." However, the government
was not wholly responsible. House blamed the imperialistic industrial and trading interests.
These interests hoped for speedy German victories which would bring expanded markets
and colonies. 1 THE INTIMATE PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE (C. Seymour ed. 1926-28). Link
reports that when Wilson was told that persons were saying he "wanted war," the President
was extremely surprised. What he really wanted was to explore the possibilities of the
United States as arbitrator, leading toward a "postwar league of nations." A. LINK.
CONFUSIONS AND CRISES 1915-1916 at 143 (1964).
2Wilson was influential in fnrming the League of Nations, and that influence was felt
strongly in the creation of the United Nations. Its fundamental goals "began where the
League left off." These goals were maintenance of international peace and development of
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extraordinary task of reconstruction could be accomplished only
by novel forms of international collaboration. Wartime and post-
war cooperation created a momentum of its own which facili-
tated the construction of more permanent institutions at both
international and regional levels.
Out of this fluid, experimental and creative mood emerged the
United Nations 3, a host of specialized agencies, significantly
those in the economic field, and various regional bodies.4 In light
of its isolationist tradition, America's central role in this con-
structive enterprise was striking at the time and seems the more
remarkable today as interest in international matters ebbs.
I
It is instructive to examine the European Community against
this background. Quite apart from the significance of the integra-
tion movement to Europe's long quest for unity,5 the achieve-
ments, obstacles and failures of the European endeavor shed
light on the prospects, such as they are, for general progress in
imposing order at the international level.
economic and social programs. Haviland states that the idea of the U.N. as a coalition of
world powers responsible for the maintenance of world security was based on the League
Council and the Concert of Europe. H. HAVILAND, THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY 6 (1951). In M. HILL, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
LEAGUE OP NATIONS 116-119 (1946), Hill states that the proposals to the United Nations for a
special council responsible for economic and social programs were shaped by the prevalent
attitudes espoused by the League Council. Moreover, the acceptance of the League Council
as a legitimate political authority contributed to the general stature of the General Assembly
of the United Nations. Goodrich points out, "it should he a cause neither of surprise nor
of concern to find that the United Nations is for all practical purposes a continuation of the
League of Nations. Rather it would be disturbing if the architects of world organization
had completely or largely thrown aside the designs and materials of the past." Goodrich,
From League of Nations to United Nations, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 20 (1947).
For a detailed account of the planning stage, see 2 THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 1625-
1742 (1948); E. CHASE, THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION 17-30 (1950); V. DEAN, THE
FOUR CORNERSTONES OF PEACE (1946): L. GOODRICH and E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS (rev. ed. 1949) cited in HAVILAND, supra,
at 5 n.1.
The Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, T.S. 993, 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into
force Oct. 24, 1945), establishes an international organization to be known as the United
Nations consisting of six principal organs: a General Assembly, U.N. CHARTER arts. 7,
9-22; a Security Council, U.N. CHARTER arts. 7, 23-54; an Economic and Social Council,
U.N. CHARTER arts. 7, 55-72; a Trusteeship Council, U.N. CHARTER arts. 7, 86-91: an Inter-
national Court, U.N. CHARTER arts. 7, 92-96; and a Secretariat, U.N. CHARTER arts. 7,
97-101.
4The novel forms of international collaboration are endless. A few examples are the
following: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241,
T.I.A.S. No. 1964 (entered into force Aug. 24, 1949); Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 (entered into force
Sept. 30, 1961): European Free Trade Association (EFTA), November, 1959 [1960] G.B.
T.S. No. 30 (CMD. 1026), 370 U.N.T.S. 5 (1960); United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration (UNRRA) [1943] G.B. T.S. No. 3 (CMD. 6491), E.A.S. No. 352. See A.
ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 27-29 (3rd ed. 1973) regarding EFTA and the OECD;
see UNRRA (G. Woodbridge, ed. 1950).
O For political aspects of unification see Spinelli, The Growth of the European Movement
since World War II, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 37-63 (C. Grove Haines ed. 1957); Van
Kleffens, The Case for European Integration: Political Considerations, Id. at 80-96; Nord,
In Search of a Political Framework for an Integrated Europe, Id. at 215-228: E. HAAS,
THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES 1950-1957 (rev. ed.
1969). For economic aspects see Delouvrier, Economic Integration: Problems and Possibili-
ties, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, sapra, at 114-124: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EUROPE (G.
Denton ed. 1969). See gene7ally I. BELOFF, EUROPE AND THE EUROPEANS (1957).
EUROPE AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
As contrasted with the limited attempts of other regions or
the efforts at world-wide organization, the Western European
movement had, and still has, marked advantages. French Foreign
Minister Schuman's initiative in 1950 for the European Coal
and Steel Community was addressed to countries each of which
had been either defeated or occupied.6 Memories of disaster were
vivid. Through the leverage of the Marshall Plan, the Euro-
peans had been forced to cooperate by their American bene-
factors, who then went on to give periodic lectures on the ad-
vantages of European unity. The Europeans were as one in
awareness of a Soviet menace, sharpened by the coup in Czecho-
slovakia and the Berlin blockade. Despite centuries of conflict,
European homogeneity--cultural, religious, political and eco-
nomic--created an atmosphere conducive to the unprecedented
drive toward European integration. Europe was momentarily
blessed with leaders of vision and courage. It was an altogether
fortuitous combination of events and men.
Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet were determined that their
initiative would not be diluted into merely another organization
of sovereign national states.' The treaties (first for the Coal and
Steel Community,8 then for EURATOM9 and the European Eco-
6 On May 9, 1950, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, proposed that French
and German coal and steel production be placed under a "common high authority" in an
organization to be open to other Europeans. Negotiations for the new community began
in June, 1950 between Belgium, Germany, Italy, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
Great Britain refused to join in those negotiations, because she rejected the supranational
principle which would interfere with the traditional international principle of national
sovereignty and remove the control of basic industries from domestic jurisdiction. See H.
SCHMITT, THE PATH TO EUROPEAN UNION 49. 63-66 (1962); Vernon, The Schuman Plan, 47
AM. J. INT'L L. 183 (1953); Bebr, European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and
Legal Innovation, 63 YALE L.J. 1 (1953): in DIEBOLD, THE SCHUMAN PLAN (1959): P.
REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE Du CHARBON ET Dr L'AcIxR (1953); Pelia, The
Coal and Steel Community as a Case Study in Integration, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.
supra note 5 at 137-149. The text of the Schuman Declaration may be found in THB
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A DOCUMENTARY COLLECTION 31-33
(H. Bliss ed. 1970).
During the negotiations, Monnet and Schuman insisted on the principle of suprana-
tionality. As to the meaning of the principle, see E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA: READINGS, CASES AND PROBLEMS 75-83 (1967). Monnet's
proposals, early in the negotiations, went much farther than was acceptable to other
member states. He wanted a High Authority modelled after the parliamentary system, in
effect an "embryo European legislature," and his ideas caused sufficient dismay that on the
second day of the conference, the meeting adjourned. See HAAS, supra note 5, at 241-245
n.8; Monnet, A Ferment of Change, 1 J.C.M. STUDIES 203 (1962).
Monnet's dedication to the idea of a federated Europe continued with his formation of
the Action Committee for the United States of Europe in 1955. Recognizing the unwilling-
ness of the six governments to give up sovereignty outside the economic domain and the
restraints of the Treaty of Paris (establishing the ECSC) which did not allow an increase
in ECSC authority, Monnet formed a "supranational pressure group" composed of national
elites. See G. MALLY, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN PERSPECTIVE 76-79 (1973).
See generally HAAS, supra, at 451-485.
3 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 (1957) (entered into force July 20, 1951) (hereinafter referred to as ECSC
Treaty).
9Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, March 25, 1957. 298
U.N.T.S. 167 (1958) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) (hereinafter referred to as EURA-
TOM Treaty).
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nomic Communityl °) were conceived as organic law.11 Under the
Rome Treaties,"2 with neither terminal dates nor provisions for
withdrawal' 3 the signatories to the treaties consciously gave up
sovereignty in limited areas, explicit in the provisions for quali-
fied majority voting. 14
The emphasis on institutions was a significant innovation.
Other postwar organizations were built around delegations from
the member governments. Business would be done and decisions
made, if there were to be such, at conferences where national
sovereignty was protected by the rule of unanimity.15 The High
Authority of the Coal and Steel Community,' 6 subsequently
merged into a single 14-man European Commission,' 7 was de-
signed as an executive body with exclusive powers of initiative.' s
A nascent European Parliament was established with the injunc-
'o Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 1 CCH
Comm. MKT. REP. 1 1-5449, 298 U.N.T.S. 14 (1958) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) (known
as the Treaty of Rome) (hereinafter referred to as EEC Treaty).
" See Rawlinson, Britain and Community Law. 121 NEW L.J. 894 (1971); De Smith,
The Constitution and the Common Market: A Tentative Appraisal, 34 MOD. L. REv. 597
(1971); Pescatore. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the System of the European Com-
munities. 18 AM. J. Comp. L. 343 (1970); Trindade, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Pri-
macy of European Community Law, 35 MoD. L. REv. 376 (1972); Kozyris, National and
Supranational Law in the EEC on the Eve of British Entry, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROs.
286 (1972).
12Supra notes 9 & 10.
23 Article 240 of the EEC Treaty and article 208 of the EURATOM Treaty both state that
the Treaty is concluded for an unlimited period.
1. The Council of Ministers is the basic decision-making organ of the EEC. The voting
formula is indicative of the willingness to give up absolute sovereignty. The Treaty states
that unless otherwise provided in the Treaty, the Council shall vote under the principle of
majority voting. EEC Treaty,. art. 148(1). Under the system of qualified majority voting,
the votes of each member state are weighted. The distribution of votes among the original
Six was as follows: Luxembourg - I; Belgium and the Netherlands - 2 each; Germany,
France and Italy - 4 each. A qualified majority vote required twelve votes. EEC Treaty,
art. 148(2). The votes of the nine member states are now weighted as follows: Luxem-
bourg - 2; Denmark and Ireland - 3 each; Belgium and the Netherlands - 5 each;
Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom - 10 each. A qualified majority is forty-
one votes. EEC Treaty, art. 148(2), repealed by TREATY CONCERNING THE ACCESSION OF
THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK, IRELAND, THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
Or BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, January 22, 1972, CMND. No. 4862, 2 CCH. MKT.
REP. 11 7011 (entered into force January 1, 1973 for Denmark, Great Britain and Ireland).
Norway signed the Treaty but accession was defeated by popular referendum on September
25, 1972. That referendum was not binding on the Parliament, but the Norwegian Parlia-
ment chose to conform to popular wishes. See 2 CCH. MKT. REP. 1 7001. The subjects to be
decided by a qualified majority numbered twelve in the early period of the Treaty (1958-61),
and eighteen in the next stage (1962-65). By the end of the transitional period, the prin-
ciple of majority vote applied to most proposals.
See 1 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET; A LEGAL PROFILE 36-7
(E. Stein and T. Nicholson eds. 1960); MALLY, supra note 7, at 105-6, 313-15 (list of those
measures requiring a majority vote).
Is "Intergovernmental organizations on the traditional pattern have two distinct charac-
teristics: the rule of unanimity and the lack of executive powers. The rule of unanimity
means that no government can be bound to take action to which it does not expressly
agree; the corollary is that every government has a veto and, even when this is not exer-
cised, the speed of the fleet is the speed of the slowest ship." Robertson, Legal Problems of
European Integration, 91 RECUEIL DES CoUPS 109, 122 (1957-8).
11 See ECSC Treaty, supra note 8. Articles 8-19 of the ECSC Treaty provide for the
creation of the High Authority.
27 Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Com-
munities, April 8, 1965, 2 CCM. COMM. MET. REP. 5115, Decree of July 28, 1967, J.O. July
29, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as Merger Treaty). For a background discussion see
Thompson, The Leiden Meeting, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 276 (1966).
18 For a discussion of this major power of the Commission, see Noel, The Commission's
Power of Initiative, 10 C.M.L. REv. 123 (1973).
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tion in the treaties that in time it would be directly elected.19
Borrowing from the United States, a Court of Justice was estab-
lished with explicit powers to interpret the organic law, to settle
conflicts between national and Community law, and to be a
court of appeal for citizens or member states charging the Com-
mission or other Community institutions with violations of the
basic treaties.20 The power center of this Community structure
was the Council of Ministers, in effect the Community's legisla-
v9The European Parliamentary Assembly is an institution common to the three European
Communities, along with the Court of Justice. See Convention on Certain Institutions Com-
mon to the European Communities, March 25, 1957, arts. 1-4, 2 CCH. COMM. MKT. REP.
5100, Decree of Jan. 28, 1958, J.O. Feb. 2, 1958. 1 AMERICAN ENTsPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE, supra note 14, at 51-68.
The delegates to the Assembly were originally to be designated by the respective Parlia-
ments from among their members pursuant to the procedure decided upon by each State.
ECSC Treaty, art. 21(1), substituted by the Convention on Certain Institutions Common to
the European Communities, supra, art. 2; EEC Treaty, art. 188(1); EURATOM Treaty
art. 108(1). Each Treaty also stated that the "Assembly shall draw up proposals for
elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member
States." ECSC Treaty, art. 21(8), substituted by the Convention on Certain Institutions
Common to the European Communities, supro. art. 2; EEC Treaty, art. 138(8); EURATOM
Treaty, art. 108. On that plan see Stein, Integration, Unif cation, Harmonization and the
Politics of the Possible: The Convention on "European" Elections, in the XXth CENTURY
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTs LAW, LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESsEL E. YNTEMA 509-530
(K. Nadelmann, A. Von Mehren, and J. Hazard eds. 1961). Direct elections still do not
take place. See Allott, The European Parliament and the Westminster Parliament. 11
C.M.L. REV. 298, 309-314 (1974).
It has been suggested that the Assembly Is not a true legislature. See Stein, Integration.
Unification, Harmonization and the Politics of the Possible, supra. at 510. The Parliament
has the power to pass a motion of censure adopted by a two-thirds majority. EEC Treaty.
art. 144. The Assembly discusses the annual general report submitted by the Commission.
EEC Treaty, art. 143. The Assembly and its members have the right to pose oral and
written questions to the Commission which must respond. EEC Treaty, art. 140. When the
Treaty so specifies, the Council must consult the Assembly. EEC Treaty, arts. 43(2), 75(1).
87(1), 100, 235-38. Although the Assembly must be consulted on the budget, EEC Treaty.
art. 203(3), substituted by Treaty Amending Certain Budgetary Provisions of the Treaties
Establishing the Europcan Communities and of the Treaty Establishing A Single Commis-
sion of the European Communities, April 22, 1970, CKND. 4867, its opinion is not binding
on the Council. See I AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL
PROFILE, supra, n.8 at 56. Thus, "[u]nlke a parliament, it has no power to legislate and
thus to impose its policy, nor does it possess 'the power of the purse' in the parliamentary
sense." Id. Still the Assembly emphasizes its parliamentary nature: "If legitimate doubt
arises with respect to a question concerning the status of this Assembly one must seek the
solution in the traditional parliamentary law and not in the unfounded comparisons with
commissions, assemblies or organizations of an international character," states one Assem-
bly report. Id. 56, n.125.
"5 The Court of Justice of the European Communities succeeded the Court of Justice of
the European Coal and Steel Community. ECSC Treaty, arts. 31-45. The present Court
exercises the jurisdiction conferred upon the ECSC Court. Convention on Certain Common
Institutions, supra note 19, art. 4(1). Cf. Bebr, The Development of a Community Law by
the Court of the European Coal and Steel Community, 42 MINN. L. Rrv. 845, 858 n.80
(1958). The Court's composition is governed by the EEC Treaty, art. 167(1) and EURA-
TOM Treaty, art. 139. The Rules of the Court are found in the Protocol to the EEC
Treaty: Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Com-
munity, April 17, 1957, CCU. COMM. MKT. REP. U 4731, 298 U.N.T.S. 148-56 (1958). The
Court's powers to interpret the Treaty are found in the EEC Treaty, arts. 164, 177. For
the Court's jurisdiction, see, e.g., EEC Treaty, art. 177. For the types of jurisdiction, see
I D. VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 9-15 (1965). As
to conflicts between national and Community law, see Bebr, How Supreme is Community
Law in the National Courts?, 11 C.M.L. REV. 3 (1974). When the Court settles conflicts
between national and Community law pursuant to article 177, "it may affirm in general
terms the principle of supremacy of Community law; but it has no jurisdiction and does
not purport, to pronounce inconsistent provisions of municipal law to be invalid or inop-
erative." (footnote omitted) De Smith, supra note 11, at 605; cf. Pescatore, supra, n.11
and Trindade, supra note 11, at 377-79.
Concerning the right to appeal, see EEC Treaty, arts. 173, 189, Protocol on the Statute
of the Court, supra arts. 20, 37; see also STEIN & HAY, supra note 7, at 134-71.
On the Court in general, see Schermers, The European Court of Justice: Promoter of
European Integration, 22 Am. .T. CoMP. L. 444 (1974); Lagrange, The Role of the Court
of Justice of the European Com,"unities as Seen Through Its Case Law, 26 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 400 (1961); Dumon, La Court de Justice des Communautes europeennes et lee
juridictions des Etats membres, 14 REVUE INT'L DE DROIT COMPARE 369 (1962); Angulo
and Dawson, Access by Natural and Legal Persons to the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 36 U. CINN. L. REV. 583 (1967).
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tive body, appropriating money and enacting laws binding on
the member states.2 '
Today, attention is not directed to the impressive innovations
of the Community or even its considerable achievements, but to
European paralysis. Significantly, the problems of the Com-
munity have not been due to inherent weaknesses of the treaties,
the institutions or procedures, or even of inevitable conflict be-
tween Community and member state law. The difficulties have
been, at bottom, the lack of political will among the member
governments.
While General de Gaulle has been gone from the Elys6e for
eight years, the vibrant nationalism which bears his name lives
on.2 2 With its reverence for the nation state, sovereignty and
total freedom for unilateral action, Gaullism is antithesis of the
tentative federalism of European integration. Gradually with
Pompidou and more specifically with Giscard d'Estaing, the
French government has attempted to separate itself from the
more extreme forms of Gaullist nationalism.2 3 Ironically, it was
left to Prime Minister Wilson to pick up the fallen Gaullist
banner: voting within the Community only by unanimity, power
exclusively in the hands of the Council of Ministers, no directly-
elected Parliament, no movement of the Community into the
fields of foreign policy or political union. Britain, and to a
degree Denmark, have thrown their weight behind an evolution
which if their views were to prevail, would convert the Com-
munity into another classical intergovernmental organization.
The Community's immediate business must be to bring to a
head and settle, one way or the other, the British demand for
"renegotiation" of the terms of entry.24 Until this issue is faced
and resolved, the United Kingdom both inhibits progress and
provides the excuse for the dalliance of the other members of the
Community.
Several* contradictory phenomena have sequentially sapped
the energy of the Europeans and slowed the drive toward fur-
The Merger Treaty, supra note 17. art. 1, established one Council of the European
Communities which took the place of the Special Council of Ministers of the ECSC, and
the Councils of the EEC and EURATOM. ECSC Treaty, arts. 26-30; EEC Treaty, arts.
145-54; EURATOM Treaty, arts. 115-123. The Council consists of one representative from
each member state, designated by the Government of that state. Merger Treaty, supra
note 17. art. 2.
See STEIN & HAY, supra note 7, at 89 and Thompson, supra note 16, at 277. As to the
power to enact binding laws, see EEC Treaty, art. 189.
22 See MAJOR ADDRESSES, STATEMENTS, AND PRESS CONFERENCES OF GENERAL CHARLES DE
GAULLE, 1958.64, at 92 (1964); D. CALLEO, 'EUROPE'S FUTURE: THE GRAND ALTERNATIVES
91 (1965); MALLY, supra note 7, at 84-93 ("Internal Inhibitor: Gaullism").
"See A. HARTLEY, GAULLISM: THE RISE AND FALL OF A POLITICAL MOVEMENT 275-310
(1971); S. HOFFMAN, DECLINE OR RENEWAL? FRANCE SINCE THE 1930's at 320, 441-2 (1974);
J. CHARLOT, THE GAULLIST PHENOMENON 177, 181-6 (1971). As to the Independent Repub-
licans. the parliamentary group of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, see Id. at 109-119.
24See Kozyris, supra note 11, at 302-5; see generally Symposium - Expansion of the
Common Market. 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 221-391 (1972).
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ther unity. First, almost two decades of steady economic growth
and rising affluence created a comfortable plateau of personal
satisfaction. 2- Why suffer the trouble of change, all of the prob-
lems of restructuring Europe, -if things are going well? Second,
the gathering economic crisis produced an antithetical rationale
for inaction: the problems today are so acute and governments
so hard pressed that they lack the elbowroom for change which
prosperity offers and which is essential to fundamental social
and economic adjustment. Third, whatever may have been the
importance of the goad of Stalin and the cohesive influence of
the common fear of Soviet imperialism, detente largely elim-
inated the Eastern threat as an incentive to further integration.
Europe is also cursed by all of the problems common to the
Western world. Each of the European member states is more
notable for political weakness than strength. Even Chancellor
Schmidt, sitting on monetary reserves more than double those
of the United States, heads a party which has lost ground
dangerously in recent local elections.2 6 Uncertain political bases
in Europe produce cautious leaders preoccupied with the strug-
gle for political and economic survival.
The Community institutions were never granted, and have
been unable to acquire, sufficient independent power so that the
Commission or the European Parliament might successfully
challenge the national governments. Dependent on the suffer-
ance of the governments for decisions and for money,2 T the
Commission has been condemned to irritable frustration. Insult
has been heaped on injury. Persistent attacks, especially by
Schmidt, have been levied on the size, futility and weakness of
the Commission. In fact, the responsibility for the Community's
stagnation lies with the national governments.
Two decades' experience have brought to the surface another
fundamental obstacle to effective Community action: the ob-
structive power of entrenched national bureaucracies.28 The
effectiveness of these bureaucracies in resisting change and
hindering the work of the European institutions had been
grossly underestimated. Indeed, the volatility of several gov-
ernments at the political level only enhanced the authority of
the civil service. Large national bureaucracies, blessed, or
2' See Table 17, International Financial Statistics in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND:
ANNUAL REPORT 1973/74 at 38 (1974).
-' N.Y. Times, June 12, 1974, at 44, col. 1.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1973, at 17, col. 3.
See R. ALBRECHT-CARRIE, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE THE CONGRESS OF
VIENNA 319 (1958). See elso teuter, Juridical and Institutional Aspects of the European
Regional Communities, 26 I,A . & CONTEMP. PROS. 381 (1961); W. AXLINE, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW AND ORGA.NIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 46-7 (1968); Heidleberg, Parliamen-
tary Control and Political Groupd in the Three European Regional Communities, 26 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PRoB. 430 (19-i! ). For a theoretical analysis of bureaucracy in the interna-
tional system, see THE INTER'TIONAL SYSTEM (K. Knorr and S. Verba eds. 1961).
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cursed, by continuity, fight best when protecting their vested
interests. Like some great hydraulic pump, any progress in
Brussels at the Community level means diminution of national
prerogatives and power.
As the momentum toward unity slowed, rather than address
seriously the ponderous Community system and particularly to
the Council of Ministers' bottleneck, the heads-of-government
developed a charade of bilateral visits, princely exchanges, and
periodic Community summit conferences. Summit meetings may
be indispensable to further Community progress, but the tech-
nique is not without its costs. By creating the prospect of
progress the hopes of the public are lifted, then all too fre-
quently the results are disappointing. An almost unavoidable
consequence of the summit method is to enfeeble the institutions,
while Europe awaits the next summit or the results of the last.
To round out the picture, the Community is neither dead nor
without substantial achievement. The customs unions2 9 the com-
mercial policy, the controversial Common Agricultural Policy-
and many elements of internal economic and social policy are
in place. Workers now move freely within the Community. There
are rights of establishment.31 The Commission presses ahead
with an active competition program.32  The Europeans have a
credible record in assisting the developing countries. 33
Disenchantment has arisen from the failure of the Commu-
nity to cope with Europe's most pressing problems. The heady
goal of economic and monetary union by 1980, fading even be-
fore the 1974 oil and financial crisis, has been lost from sight.
"n EEC Treaty, arts. 9, 12-37. The goals of the treaty establishing the EEC provide for
free movement of labor, capital, and enterprise. Thus the Common Market establishes a
union between the countries as a means to economic and social progress. Elimination of
trade barriers and tariffs is a major thrust toward economic integration of the Community.
See Ortoli, The Customs Union in INTERNATIONAL MANUAL ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY 81-115 (H. Junckerstorff ed. 1963); J. VINES, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE
41-56 (1950). S. ScHEiNGoLD, THE RULE OF LAW IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE PATH
OF THE SCHUMAN PLAN 185-196 (1965). For mechanics of the establishment of the customs
union and its provisions see L. LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC INTEGRATION 16-18 (1963).
"o EEC Treaty, arts. 38-47. See generally J. DENIAU, THE COMMON MARKET: ITS STRUC-
TURE AND PURPOSE (1960); Krohn & Schmitt, The Common Agricultural Policy in INTER-
NATIONAL MANUAL ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, euzwa n.81, at 267-386; see
ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 178-9.
31EEC Treaty, arts. 48-51 (workers), arts. 52-58 (right of establishment). The treaty
provides as well for the free movement of workers inside the Community. This movement
is especially significant for the integration of economies of those countries which form the
economic community. Article 48, paragraphs 1 and 2, provides that by the end of the
transition period workers will move freely from country to country, unimpeded, as members
of the European Economic Community, abolishing discrimination by nationality in regard
to employment and working conditions. Scholz, Bruns-Wuestefeld, Le Tallec, and Bronsart,
The Right of Establishment in the EEC in INTERNATIONAL MANUAL ON THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, supra 31 at 233-66.
M See Van Themaat, Rules of Competition and Restrictive Trade Practices in LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE Asso-
CIATION 76-88 (1963). See also A. DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC RULES OF COMPETITION (ARTICLES
85-90), INCLUDING THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES (1968). See generally
J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC, A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1973).
31 N.Y. Times, March 31, 1971, at 67, col. 1.
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Indeed, it was not until October, 1974, that the Community
began to put together a borrowing facility to deal with the
mushrooming balance-of-payments deficits of the member
states.34 A year after the Yom Kippur war only the rudiments
of a Community energy policy existed, despite endless prodding
by the Commission.3 5 Due to disagreement among the member
states a regional policy to deal with depressed areas in the Com-
munity, in Southern Italy, the British Midlands and Ireland,
remained in abeyance until the end of 1974.
The danger is not some coup de grdce to the Community, the
ill effects of possible British withdrawal, the unlikely end result
of "renegotiation," or even collapse through failure to deal with
the major problems of energy and economic crisis. The threat
is a continued, helpless drift toward irrelevance with the inde-
pendent Commission becoming no more than a dependent secre-
tariat to a Community which is not a Community but only
another regional organization of sovereign states.
Of itself absorbing, the European Community is, as well, a
case study shedding light on the general malaise infecting all
contemporary society.
European heads-of-government typify contemporary addic-
tion to personal diplomacy. The illusion of action has been
found to be less exacting than the substance. They cherish the
transient political advantage of the high visibility of foreign
visits. They care little for and, indeed, in certain cases derive
satisfaction from the degree to which this self-serving process
undermines the essential bureaucracies of their own countries
and the European institutions which they are presumably obli-
gated to support.
When the member states finally agreed in October, 1974, on
a Community borrowing authority, 36 the Council of Ministers
cast about for some alternative that would keep the new project
out of the hands of their own executive body, the European
Commission. When new functions must be undertaken, the
reflex action of the governments has been to create some new
entity, at best tangentially related to existing organizations.
Closely akin to personal diplomacy is the absent-minded or
in some cases determined attack on the established Community
bureaucracy, suddenly cast in the role of the "enemy." This
confrontation seems bizarre when one realizes that the bu-
reaucracy is nothing more than the creature of the governments.
34 Proposal for A Council Regulation Concerning Community Loans, E.E.C. J.0. C129
(1974).
0 Supra note 27.
36 Supra note 34.
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If the Community institutions are deficient it is the political
leaders of the member states who are responsible. Yet, Chan-
cellor Schmidt excoriates the European Commission as though
it were some extra-European phenomenon imposed on Bonn
and the other countries. Whatever the weaknesses and short-
comings of the European institutions they can be remedied only
by firm member state action.
Western Europe seems bent on constructing the ultimate para-
dox: If Europe is to survive, common action becomes not merely
desirable, 'but inescapable. While this truism is mouthed by all
politicians, the instinctive reaction is the antithesis, further
excess of blind nationalism.
II
In point of fact, the international system suffers from each
of the foregoing maladies, and from several others as well. For
instance, the advanced industrialized countries still cling, in
large part, to the principle of the integrity of contract. They
correctly see this principle as central to any viable economic
order. The repetitious denunciation by the Arab States of "bind-
ing agreements ' 3 7 has had the side effect of muffling the shock
of this violation of contract. In the summer of 1973, when a
hemorrhage of exports occurred, the Nixon Administration pre-
cipitously imposed an embargo on some 30 agricultural prod-
ucts, 38 without reference to outstanding contracts. This danger-
ous virus of allowing national interests to override any foreign
obligation can easily spread through both developing and ad-
vanced countries.
Related to the erosion of international contract has been a
parallel wasting away of the rule of "just, prompt and effective
compensation" for private property which is nationalized.30 A
further and different example of contempt for treaty obligation
came in the mid-1960s when de Gaulle decided that the language
of the Treaty of Rome was unacceptable. For almost a year
3 N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1973, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1973, at 45, col. 3; N.Y.
Times, May 16, 1973, at 6. col. 4; N.Y. Times, May 20, 1973, at 4, col. 4.
38 N.Y. Times, June 20, 1973, at 55, col. 8; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1973, at 63. col. 4.
3As to the formula of "just, prompt and effective compensation." see RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1965) § 187, and in general
§ 185-92. This formula represents the position advocated by the United States. The classic
statement is found in the diplomatic notes of Secretary of State Hull to the Mexican Am-
bassador in 1938 relating to expropriation of United States nationals' property in Mexico
under Mexican land reform. See 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655, 668-59
(1942). But ace Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). where the
United States Supreme Court refused to decide whether the expropriation, without com-
pensation of U.S. nationals' property in Cuba constituted a violation of international law.
Id. at 428.
See the Hickenlooper Amendment, 76 Stat. 260 (1962). as amended, Foreign Assistance
Act of 1973, 1 15, 87 Stat. 714 at 722.
For an introduction to this area, see F. V. GARCIA-AMADOR, L. SOHN, & R. BAXTER,
RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAWS OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 45-59
(1974).
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France boycotted the European Community institutions in order
to impose French views on her five Community partners. De
Gaulle's attack centered on the decision-making process: quali-
fied majority voting versus unanimity. The boycott was ulti-
mately resolved by a compromise which met almost fully the
French objectives. The result was an unofficial, in fact, illegal
agreement that any member could declare an issue before the
Council of Ministers, a matter of "vital interest," thus assuring
that a decision could only be reached by unanimity. 0
For years, under pressure of unilateral assertion and force,
international disorder has spread with respect to territorial
waters, fishing rights and now seabed oil and mineral rights.
Iceland's battle with Great Britain is only one example of such
anarchy and the total absence of effective means of mediation
or arbitration.-
The assault on institutions and roles comes from another
quarter, the so-called "voluntary agreements" which are brought
into play when international obligations threaten to interfere
with immediate national economic interests. For instance, when
President Kennedy and then President Nixon found that ful-
filling political obligations to domestic textile interests required
the repudiation of formal international agreements and even
the abrogation of commercial contracts, they resorted to this
device.' 2 An economic shadow world emerges where political fig-
ures horse-trade, threaten, bluff and may agree - all outside the
boundaries of open covenants openly arrived at. A sudden glut
of meat upsets the domestic American market and the instinc-
tive means of redress is a personal demand from the Secretary
of Agriculture to the Australians, or other exporting states,
that they "voluntarily" restrict their shipments to the United
States. Behind the personal petition, only half-hidden, is the
threat of harsher American actions - Congressional mandate,
retaliation, withdrawal of concessions in other areas, etc.
40 See Hjorth, The Common Agricultural Policy: Crisis in the Common Market, 40 WASH.
L. REv. 685 (1965); Riesenfeld, Common Market for Agricultural Products and Common
Agricultural Policy in the European Economic Community, U. ILL. L. FORUM 658 (1965):
Luxembourg Accords Treaty in Mally, supra note 7, at 106-7; STMiN & HAY, supra note 7.
at 106-13; Lambert, The Constitutional Crisis 1965-66, 4 J.C.M. STUDIES 195 (1966). THE
POLITIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, A DOCUMENTARY COLLECTION 159-88
(H. Bliss, ed. 1970).
H The latest stage of the conflict over Iceland's extension of her exclusive fisheries zone
from 12 to 50 miles was referred to the International Court of Justice after "several
months of fruitless negotiations .... " See Churchill, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases: The
Contribution of the Internatiosal Court of Justice to the Debate on Coastal States' Fisheries
Rights, 24 INT'L COMp. L.Q. 82-85 (1975). Before the ICJ gave a judgment on the merits,
the United Kingdom and Iceland came to an interim agreement on November 13, 1973, for
a two year period, but "without prejudice to the legal position or rights of either Gov-
ernment in relation to the substantive dispute." Id. at 85. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
(United Kingdom v. Iceland), PRc jest for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection,
order of Aug. 17, 1972 [1972] I.C.J. 12; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v.
Iceland), Continuance of Interim Measures of Protection, order of July 12. 1973 [1973]
I.C.J. 302; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Jurisdiction of the
Court, judgment of Feb. 2. 19713 [1973] I.C.J. 3.
42 N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1973. at 34, col. 3.
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Common to all of these contemporary diseases is what Alec
Cairncross dubbed, "ad hocery," pragmatism run riot. Each
case is taken up on its immediate merits outside any larger
framework and with slight attention to formal obligations.
Organizations, orderly procedures, responsible bureaucracies,
either domestic and foreign, are ignored. It may indeed be
"ad hocery," but it is also the highway to anarchy.
III
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,' 3 an institution
which replaced the stillborn International Trade Organization,
had done useful work when the members were few in number
and shared a sense of common responsibility to international
obligation. As membership expanded it became commonplace
to twist the rules. For instance, "grandfather clauses"" were
abused by the United States to retain full freedom to continue
agriculture policies manifestly at odds with GATT principles:
the European Community was able to obtain sanction for pref-
erential arrangements with African states in clear violation of
the GATT - they had the votes.
A less explicable case, in view of America's dominant posi-
tion in an organization which includes weighted voting, was
Washington's calculated assault on the International Monetary
Fund. Neither Secretary of the Treasury Connally nor the
Nixon White House had any notable tolerance for dissident
views, especially those of international civil servants. Amer-
ica's irritation with IMF Managing Director Pierre-Paul
Schweitzer's observations on the world's monetary problems was
palpable. In the course of events he was deposed but this manip-
ulative success was not followed by any perceptible change in
American coolness toward the IMF. Indeed, as the financial
crisis intensified America turned more and more toward ad hoc
meetings and new committees which had all the order of chickens
feeding in a barnyard: the Group of 20 ;45 the Big Five, the
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948), as amended, and Vol. IV, BISD. See Scott, The United
States Response to Common Market Trade Preferences and the Legality of the Import
Surcharge, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 177 (1971): 24 UN FOOD & AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION,
TRADE YEARBOOK 420, Table 120 (1970); W. ZARTMAN, THE POLITICS Op TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 93 (1971); Van DenBergh, The New Convention o tion with African States, 1 C.M.L. REV. 156, 162-64
(1963); GATT. DEVELOPMENT PLAN STUDIES: THE FIRST SIX YEAR PLAN Or NIGERIA 21
(1966); K. DAM, THE GATr: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 23-36
(1970); VINES, supra note 31; Dam, Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATT: The
Legacy of a Misconception, 30 U. CHl L. REV. 615, 625 (1963).
""Grandfather clause" refers to the fact that at the time the GATT was negotiated the
United States was given waivers for particular obligations. That is, the United States,
before applying countervailing duties, did not have to comply with certain provisions of
the GATT such as dairy import quotas. United States law existing prior to GATT would
stay in effect even during the GATT. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT, 28, 264-70, 548, 638, 665, 692, 770 (1969).
4 The Group of 20 was set up under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund to
look Into International monetary reform.
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U.S., Japan, Germany, France, and the UK (the latter espe-
cially interesting in light of Britain's putative insolvency), with
Italy as belated gate-crasher; mysterious meetings of central
bankers at Basle - and so it went.
One of the more mystifying aspects of Washington's diplo-
macy has been its persistent shunning of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.' 6 Purposefully de-
signed, with the United States playing a leading role, to include
the advanced countries and to deal with their special problems,
the OECD would seem ideally suited with its limited member-
ship and flexibility to deal with the energy-financial crisis. Yet,
for the better part of a year the American government success-
fully excluded the OECD. The first energy initiative, Kissinger's
Pilgrim speech in London in late 1973, 4 proposed an ephemeral
group of experts; this was replaced by the February 1974 meet-
ing of Foreign Ministers in Washington; then, there emerged
the Group of 12, which came to be 11 when Norway held back.
Ultimately the International Atomic Energy Agency evolved.'8
An early American decision to deal with the energy question
within the OECD, with all its flexibility, might have avoided the
debilitating confrontation between the United States and France
and the separation of France from her European associates
on this issue.
IV
Out of these random cases emerge certain common denomina-
tors. One recurring factor is discouragingly clear: the unwilling-
ness of governments to transfer authority to international or-
ganizations, whether regional, multinational or international.
Reluctant to acknowledge the implications of interdependence,
glorifying the national sovereignty that does not exist, each na-
tion conspires to weaken the very process and the institutions
which might offer salvation.
The international system also suffers from the profligate use
of the summit meeting, for the drama and personal political
advantage that the device offers and the publicity accruing to
the head-of-govermnent or foreign secretary who calls his own
conference. At best, the desire to get at the substance of the
issue is no more than equal to the sponsor's quest for domestic
political benefit. These mixed objectives and the generally casual
preparation usually end in superficial meetings, lead to public
4Supra note 4; N.Y. Tirne . "ne 4, 1974, at 47, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 7, 1974, at
1, col. 3.
47N.Y. Times, Dec. 13. 19%. at 28, col. 1 (text of speech); N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1973,
at 1. col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 14. 1973, at 14, col. 3.
"Agreement for Cooperati-. in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. May 11, 1959, 10
U.S.T. 1424, T.I.A.S. No. 429'
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boredom and further detract from the authority of existing
institutions.
Nationalism marked the August 1971 financial crisis. 49 While
the overvalued, ostensibly convertible dollar required drastic
medicine, unilateral American action was unnecessary. One
result was to deliver a devastating blow to the already weakened
international financial system. In the wake of the crisis the
inevitable working parties were set in motion, but no effort was
made to bring anything to a head. It had to be assumed that
Washington found to its advantage this undisciplined, "state of
nature," financial order.
Indeed, non-institutionalized economic affairs were in har-
monious counterpoint to Kissinger's approach to international
politics: insistence on freedom of action and a willingness to
employ power to advance American policies and to control the
direction of Western events. In contrast, the use of or the re-
liance on international institutions would reduce the area for
pragmatic movement and limit national freedom of action.
Hooked on "summitry" and diplomatic showmanship, suspi-
cious of all bureaucracy, bored by economics and institutions,
closed in by a country preoccupied with domestic problems and
impatient with ungrateful foreigners, Washington gives the
regime of institutions and rules short shrift.
V
In this interdependent, interconnected world we face the
choice between mutually destructive national actions and reac-
tions or the repair and reinforcement of the system of institu-
tions and rules. No nation can escape this question or choice.
The African and Arab states, heady with power, make their
contribution to international anarchy. But the Atlantic nations
carry a special responsibility. Steeped in experience with demo-
cratic institutions they pride themselves on governments of
laws not men. Against this tradition the commissions and omis-
sions of the last years are indefensible.
The international system, elementary and weak, can take little
more indifference and abuse. The various bodies and the endless
meetings will continue, no matter what, but they will become
even more forums for the gossip of irrelevant officials. To arrest
this process of decay the first step must be a decision among
leaders of the principal countries that the international system
must be preserved. This cannot be done, even initiated, without
49N.Y. Times. Aug. 14, 1971, at 31, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
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the United States and more particularly without American
leadership.
American authorities have another reason to address this
problem. Disengagement from international affairs on the part
of the American public accelerates. It is not classical isolation-
ism so much as preoccupation with domestic issues and disin-
terest in complicated and apparently insoluble foreign problems.
Strong international institutions provide some bulwark against
this trend. As America struggled free from its isolationist tra-
dition, the United Nations came to be a rallying symbol for
the new internationalist, just as NATO was for those who
sensed the vital importance of the Atlantic relationship. One
effect of personal diplomacy and summit spectaculars, with
established institutions left unused in the shadows, is to convert
the citizen into passive spectator.
There is little likelihood that infinitely complex defense, po-
litical, economic and social problems will succumb to some over-
arching, "general field" theory within which each piece neatly
fits. Answers will be partial and unsatisfactory. The public
grows, at best, impatient with the expert's explanation or intri-
cate expositions. If there is no clear, complete answer, the public
must be given a system, institutions, rules and a process for
dealing seriously with the world's major problems.
This renaissance can begin only at a few points and with
luck perhaps start a trend. The obvious points of attack are
those where a sense of general urgency exists and a consensus
may be possible. The European Community is one such area.
The common interests of the members, the need for "European"
answers, and the perils they face together created a sense of
urgency that led to partial action at the December 1974 Paris
Summit.5° On the international level the spreading economic
crisis makes collective responses almost unavoidable. The OECD
is there to be used. The International Monetary Fund can be
adjusted, amended and expanded in order to cope with the un-
precedented world financial crisis. With U.S. trade legislation
finally passed, the road is open for both negotiations and steps
to strengthen the trading system.
This will not be possible unless a deliberate effort is made to
stem the excess of personal diplomacy, a political disease that,
thanks in no small part to Nixon and Kissinger, has reached
epidemic proportions Its debilitating effects are all too appar-
ent: foreign relatioi.., Lhat rely on the personal ingredient are
5°Communique of European Community "Summit Meeting," Background Note No. 27/
1974. December 16. European Cqmmunity Information Service, Washington, D.C.
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intrinsically unstable and impermanent. Furthermore, personal
diplomacy is the enemy of democratic practice, which assumes
broad popular involvement and openness. Due to the great
weight! of the United States in world affairs, when Washington
makes personal diplomacy the centerpiece of its conduct of for-
eign policy the adverse effects are multiplied many times.
To emphasize institutions and rules in no way assigns unim-
portance to substantive policies. The finest international ma-
chine will spin in futility without good policies. But the stress
on the institutional factors is required to counter the pervasive
disdain and indifference governments currently give to this
essential part of the international system. There is another
reason. In view of the general absence of consensus on policies
to deal with unprecedented international problems, for instance
in the fields of trade and finance, there is merit in concentrating
initially on organization which involves a collective search for
answers.
It is inexplicable that the United States, proud of its mana-
gerial and organizational talents, with its commitment to gov-
ernment by law, should stand by indifferent to the decay of the
international system. This insensitivity is even harder to under-
stand in the" aftermath of Watergate and America's sharpened
sensitivity to the crucial importance of law and constitutional
procedures.
The spreading difficulties of 1974 were no more than a prelude
to 1975, a year when the world will be put to the test. As econ-
omies stagnate, unemployment and deficits mount, governments
will be severely tempted to employ draconian measures. Parallel
to the desperate search for export markets will be schemes
to limit exports. In this environment the world could just as
easily slide into patterns of cutthroat national behavior as ad-
here to even minimal forms of international cooperation. At
this time of traumatic change one can only hope that a new
stimulus will arise and lead to a collective effort to instill a
minimum of order in this chaotic world.
